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COMMENT 
THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION: 
ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRAFFIC OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International art theft and illegal trafficking of cultural 
propertyl has reached epidemic proportions.2 In value trans-
ferred, the illicit art trade ranks second only to narcotics traf-
ficking.3 Art theft is rampant in many countries that are rich 
in art and archaeological resources, and stolen pieces are 
rarely recovered.4 Furthermore, current statistics do not re-
flect the countless archeological artifacts which are secretly 
1. For the purposes of this article, "cultural property" refers to works of art 
that are considered an integral part of a country's cultural heritage, history or 
ethnicity. 
2. Over $2 billion worth of art stolen each year. John Larrabee, Price Is 
Placed On The Priceless, USA TODAY, March 17, 1995 at 4A [hereinafter 
Larrabee]. The rate of theft increases 10% each year. Frances Gibb, High Art And 
Low Cunning, THE TIMES, July 4, 1995 (Features) [hereinafter Gibb). 
3. Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does 
the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the 
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 473 (1994) [hereinafter 
Lenzner]. 
4. William D. Montalbano, Big Business Art Thieves Find Italy Is a Gold 
Mine, Los ANGELES TIMES, August 25, 1988, at 16 [hereinafter Montalbano]. For 
example, in Italy, thieves rob churches, museums and private collections of their 
art objects at a rate of more than one per hour. Id. Worldwide, the recovery rate 
of stolen art ranges between ten and fifteen percent. John Rockwell, Rome Has a 
Show of Stolen Artworks to Highlight a Fight, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 25, 
1994, at C13, C19 [hereinafter Rockwell] In Italy, of the 29,000 works of art sto-
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excavated and illegally exported every year.5 Intensifying the 
problem are conflicting laws among nations regarding property 
rights and the export of cultural property which often facilitate 
art theft and illicit trade of cultural objects.6 The recent re-
moval of internal borders within the newly formed European 
Union has made illegal export of cultural property even easi-
er.7 Consequently, the member states of the European Union 
have sought increased protection of their cultural property. 8 
This Comment will begin by providing a background of the 
various types of art theft and the steps, including the 
UNESCO Convention, the US Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act and the EC Directive and Regulation, that European 
countries and the United States have taken to curb the illicit 
trade in works of art.9 This Comment will then examine the 
recently enacted UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural ObjectslO (hereinafter "UNIDROIT Conven-
5. John H. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, 4 INT'L 
J. CULTURAL PRoP. No.1, 13, 34 n.100 (1995) [hereinafter Merryman, A Licit Inter-
national Trade in Cultural Objects]. 
6. Victoria Vitrano, Protecting Cultural Objects in an Internal Border-Free EC: 
The EC Directive and Regulation for the Protection and Return of Cultural Objects, 
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1164, 1169 (1994) [hereinafter Vitrano]. 
7. Id. at 1165. The removal of internal borders within the European Union 
results in the elimination of customs posts and border checks. Id. Thieves can 
easily tranaport stolen objects from one European country to another. Richard 
Mangnall, UK' Special Report - Fine Art and Specie -Highlighting Causes of Theft 
Can Aid Prevention, LWYD'S LIST, REUTER TExTLINE, April 10, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File [hereinafter Mangnall]. 
8. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1164. According to Jean-Michel Mimerand, direc-
tor of the Office for Repression of Art Thefts, in Paris, "France and Italy, closely 
followed by Spain, are the most pillaged countries. The criminal networks are well 
organized to get the merchandise out to transit countries very quickly." William 
Tuohy, Art Thievery Is Thriving, L.A. TIMES, August 16, 1994, (World Report) at 4 
[hereinafter Tuohy]. 
The fifteen member states of the European Union presently include Belgium, 
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Treaty on 
European Union or Maastricht Treaty, 31 I.L.M. 297 (1992) [hereinafter EEC Trea-
ty]. 
9. See infra notes 54-195, examining the types of export laws and internation-
al accords the member States of the European Union and the United States have 
implemented to deter the theft and illegal export of art and cultural property. 
10. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 23, 1995 [herein-
after UNIDROIT Convention]. See Appendix for the text of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention. 
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tion") and discuss why art importing nations oppose it. This 
Comment will conclude that because the final draft of the 
UNIDROIT Convention contains many provisions that the 
museum community and commercial art world find unaccept-
able, the Convention risks losing art importing nations as 
signatories. ll Consequently, the UNIDROIT Convention may 
be just as ineffective as previous legislation in providing legal 
remedies to prevent the theft of, and facilitate the return of, 
stolen cultural property. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The sky-rocketing value of art has made international art 
theft and trade especially attractive to thieves. 12 Art theft has 
increased rapidly throughout the world because the objects are 
extremely valuable, easily hidden and transported, and the 
legal owne'r of the work is difficult to identify. IS Generally, art 
theft is divided into two categories, private theft and illegal 
export. 14 In order to curb both private theft within a country 
and the illegal export of art, numerous countries, including 
many European nations and the United States, have enacted 
laws regulating art trade within their own borders. 15 In addi-
11. See infra notes 199-263 and accompanying text. 
12. Julian Radcliffe, UK: Art Loss Register to Help Combat Increase in Fine 
Art Theft, REUTER TExTLINE, REVIEW, April 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Txtnws File [hereinafter Radcliffe]. Since World War II, a rising interest in 
antiquities has caused a dramatic increase in their monetary value. Paul M. Bator, 
An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275, 291 (1982) 
[hereinafter Bator]. Exorbitant prices have provoked a world-wide search for an-
tique objects and have fueled the black market. Id. Paintings are bringing in pric-
es never seen before. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 475 n.25. Van Gogh's Irises sold 
for $53.9 million in 1987; Van Gogh's "Portrait of Dr. Cachet" which sold for $82.5 
million in May, 1990, is the most expensive work ever sold in an auction. Id. 
13. Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts and Antiquities, 36 
How. L.J. 17, 20-21 (1993) [hereinafter Collin]. Even if an art thief is caught, the 
police must prove where the art objects came from. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 4. 
According to Scotland Yard's Detective Inspector Jill McTigue, "Our biggest prob-
lem is finding where the artistic loot is stolen from." Id. 
14. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 471. Lenzner explains that art theft exists in 
two distinct forms: the theft of works of art from their owners and the illegal 
export of art. Id. 
See infra notes 19-53 and accompanying text discussing private art theft 
and the illegal export of cultural property. 
15. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text discussing various national 
laws restricting the export of cultural property. 
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tion, governments have combined efforts to reduce the illicit 
trade of cultural property by signing international agreements 
and accords. 16 
A. Two FORMS OF ART THEFT: PRIVATE THEFT AND ILLEGAL 
EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
Art theft occurs in two distinct ways.17 First, private theft 
occurs when art thieves steal directly from the owners of art, 
including private collections, museums, galleries, and the 
State.18 Second, the illegal export of art occurs when the cul-
tural property of nations that regulate the movement of these 
types of objects is transported outside those national bor-
ders.19 
1. Private Art Theft 
Private theft occurs when thieves rob collections, museums 
and institutions, whether public or private, of their art and 
archaeological objects.20 In Italy and much of Western Europe, 
churches are the prime targets of art thieves.21 In the United 
States, galleries and private collections are the most common 
targets of art theft.22 Although criminals now prefer art theft 
See infra notes 131-164 and accompanying text discussing the United States' 
Cultural Property Implementation Act and United States court rulings defining 
legislation on cultural property in this country. 
16. See infra notes 93-130, discussing the UNESCO Convention of 1970, the 
EC Directive and EC Regulation on the movement of cultural property. 
See infra notes 93-263, discussing the UNIDROIT Convention passed in June, 
1995. 
17. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 471. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. at 472. megal export does not necessarily imply theft. [d. at 472 n.16. 
Although countries with restrictive export laws claim illegally exported objects are 
"stolen," the United States has traditionally rejected this view. [d. 
20. [d. at 471. 
21. Daniel Golden, HOT ART; With Picassos Going for $38 Million, Art Theft 
Has Become a Booming Billion·Dollar Illegal Business, Second Only to Narcotics, 
BOSTON GLOBE, February 12, 1989, (Magazine), at 16, 24 [hereinafter Golden]. 
22. [d. In March 1990, thieves stole $200 million in paintings from the 
Isabella Steward Gardner Museum in Boston, in the most expensive art theft in 
history. Radcliffe, supra note 12. The thieves entered the museum disguised as 
policemen, bound and gagged the guards, removed the film from surveillance cam-
eras and disarmed the alarms. [d. They made off with one Vermeer, one Manet 
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over bank robbery, museums cannot afford to install the most 
sophisticated security systems.23 Additionally, private collec-
tions are rarely better equipped to protect themselves from 
thieves.24 
Large and small-scale thefts of valuable art works occur 
continually. In 1990, masked men broke into a storeroom at 
ancient Herculaneum near Pompeii and stole over 200 antiq-
uities worth over $18 million.25 In 1991, armed robbers broke 
into Amsterdam's Van Gogh Museum and escaped with twenty 
Dutch Impressionist works.26 In 1994, thieves demanded $1 
million ransom for Norway's most famous painting, Edvard 
Munch's "The Scream", stolen from the National Gallery in 
February of that year.27 Usually, rare and famous art objects 
are safer from theft than lesser known pieces because rare 
objects draw too much attention to be sold discreetly.28 How-
ever, some wealthy art collectors will commission thieves to 
steal famous works who then ship them to South America, 
Switzerland or Japan.29 
and three Rembrandt paintings. [d. The thieves irreparably damaged the two 
Rembrandts when they cut them from their frames. Id. 
23. Mangnall, supra note 7. 
24. Id. Criminals recognize art theft is a lucrative crime and are using vio-
lence at an increasing rate. Id. Professor Norman Palmer, Rowe & Maw Professor 
of Commercial Law at University College London says that, "not only is art theft 
more common, it is less discriminate, more violent, less scrupulous, better 
organised and more closely tied to organised crime generally." Gibb, supra note 2, 
at 33. 
25. James Walsh, It's a Steal, TIME, November 25, 1991, (Art), at 86 [herein-
after Walsh]. 
26. Id. A flat tire on the thieves' getaway car allowed authorities to recover 
the stolen paintings which exceeded $500 million in value. Id. 
27. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 1. Luckily, police succeeded in finding the painting 
before delivering the ransom. Id. In June, 1994, a thief managed to steal a 17th 
century portrait from the Louvre, in Paris, between the rounds of the guards. Id. 
Later, in July of 1994, thieves bound and gagged the guard at Frankfurt's Schiro 
Kunsthalle after the gallery closed, then took three paintings insured for $45 mil-
lion. Id. The paintings stolen included two oil paintings by English Romantic 
painter J.M.W. Turner and a landscape painting by the German Master Caspar 
David Friedrich. Id. The Turner paintings were on loan from the Tate Gallery in 
London, and the Friedrich was on loan from a museum in Hamburg. Tuohy, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
28. Golden, supra note 21, at 24. "Fame is a kind of reverse insurance policy. 
Sometimes when thieves realize they have stolen a piece so well known that it is 
impossible to sell, police receive an anonymous call saying where it is abandoned." 
Montalbano, supra note 4, at 3. 
29. Radcliffe, supra note 12. These countries have laws that are conducive to 
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Sophisticated crime rings have made private art theft even 
more pervasive and complex.30 For example, art theft is often 
linked with the sale of drugs, narcotics dealers accept paint-
ings as partial payment in drug transactions and then sell 
them at auctions to receive "clean money.,,31 Furthennore, 
drug money can be laundered by purchasing high priced art at 
auctions, which can later be used as collateral or resold.32 
Moreover, highly sophisticated art thieves commit insurance 
fraud by holding an object for ransom. Increasingly, thieves 
negotiate with insurers to pay them an amount that is lower 
than the amount due under the legal owner's policy.33 
art theft. For example, in Switzerland, once one obtains a stolen painting he or 
she can lock it in a Swiss bank vault, and after five years, the object becomes 
their property as long as he or she is not the thief. Id. In Japan, there is only a 
two-year statute of limitations on stolen goods. Peter Plagens, To Catch a Thief, 
NEWSWEEK, April 2, 1990, (Arts), at 52. 
30. See Britain Wants International Art Theft Squad, REUTERS WORLD SER-
VICE, May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See Mark 
Palmer, Focus on Art Theft: Antiques Rogue Show Mark Palmer Goes on the Trail 
of a New Generation of Artful Dodgers - the Gangs Who Have discovered a Fast 
Road to Riches With the Easy Pickings of the Creme de la Creme, THE SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH, September 29, 1991, at 10 [hereinafter Palmer]. According to Mr. 
Philip Saunders, managing director of TRACE, a monthly magazine which publishes 
details regarding stolen art: "[art theft] is now so interlinked with serious crime, 
particularly the narcotics trade and the laundering of dirty money, that even if 
the police do not wish to look at it in its own right they must deal with it be-
cause of its associations." Id. 
31. Palmer, supra note 30, at 10. Detective Richard Ellis of the Art and An-
tiques Squad at London's Scotland Yard explains how the art market is used to 
launder drug money: "If you have a bundle of money which has been acquired 
through a drug sale, you can go to an auction, buy in cash and then use it as 
collateral. You can recoup the money later on with a receipt. Then you have clean 
money." Kate Dourian, Traffic in Stolen Artwork Faces Attack; Insurance: Police in 
Europe Fear That Theft Will Increase When Border Controls Are Dropped Next 
Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at A30 [hereinafter Dourian]. 
32. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30. British investigators believe that the Ital-
ian Mafia has used Italy's "single most valuable missing artwork," Caravaggio's 
1609 "Nativity," as security for drug deals for over 20 years. Walsh, supra note 
25, at 87. The work was stolen from the Oratory of San Lorenzo in Palermo, 
Sicily in 1969 and is worth approximately $50 million today. Id. U.S. authorities 
suspect that Columbian drug lords also possess priceless works of stolen art. Id. 
33. Kimberly A. Short, Preventing the Theft and Illegal Export of Art in a 
Europe Without Borders, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 633, 639 (1993) [hereinafter 
Short]. Insurance companies often pay 10% of an object's value or more to recover 
stolen art. Larrabee, supra note 2, at 4A. 
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2. Illegal Export of Cultural Property 
The second form of art theft is the illegal export of cultural 
property.34 This occurs when objects of cultural significance 
are transported or smuggled from a country that seeks to re-
tain them within its national borders.35 The illegal export of 
artifacts and art work that a government considers cultural 
property differs from private art theft in that it is committed 
by taking an object across that nation's borders, regardless of 
whether the object is exported by its true owner or a thief.36 
Illegal export is a crime against the State, because such 
action is in direct violation of State law.37 Until recently, the 
majority of legislation regarding the return of cultural property 
specified that only a government or a public institution could 
bring a cause of action against the "good faith possessor',38 of 
a stolen object.39 As a result, private art collectors had little 
recourse to obtain the return of art stolen from their collec-
tions.40 
34. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 472. 
35. 1d. 
36. John H. Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, 111 UFITA: ARCHlY 
FUR URHEBER-FILM-FuNK-UND THEATERRECT 63, 68 n.14 (1989) [hereinafter 
Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controlsl. For example, a tourist has the legal 
right to buy a work of art in a country such as Greece or Italy. 1d. However, 
since the governments of these nations prohibits the removal of such objects, it is 
illegal for the tourist to take the art when he or she leaves the country. 1d. 
37. See generally, Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, UNESCO, HANDBOOK 
OF NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, 
(1988) [hereinafter Prott & O'Keefel, citing the cultural export laws of over 180 
countries. 
38. A good faith purchaser is "one who buys without notice of circumstance 
which would put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry as to the title, or as to 
an impediment on the title of a seller." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 
1990). 
39. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972). [hereinafter UNESCO Conventionl. The UNESCO 
Convention specifies that only works of art considered "cultural property" that 
have been "stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or 
similar institution" are covered under the Convention. 1d. at art. 1. 
40. 1d. at art. 1. The UNESCO Convention, the principal piece of legislation 
regarding cultural property since its adoption in 1970, only provides the govern-
ments of signatory states the right to sue for the return of art stolen from "a 
museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution." 1d. 
7
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Traditionally, conquering powers would export a country's 
art as a show of strength and domination.41 For example, the 
Louvre houses the treasures that Napoleon brought back from 
his invasions of ltaly.42 On display at the British Museum are 
the marble friezes that Lord Elgin removed from the Parthe-
non almost two centuries ago.43 Today, however, most art is 
moved by an elaborate, international stolen art market, or 
"black market," as evidenced by the stolen European art that is 
frequently recovered abroad.44 
"Looting"45 is another significant source of the cultural 
property illegally exported on the black market.46 The illegal 
excavation of artifacts and their eventual sale has occurred for 
centuries.47 The magnitude of the black market is greatly at-
tributed to the restrictive national export laws which prevent 
the existence of any legal market for artifacts.48 The looters49 
who dig for artifacts now use modem technology such as metal 
detectors and all-terrain vehicles to conduct nighttime excava-
tions of archaeological sites in hopes of finding valuable trea-
sures.50 Local art dealers buy these archaeological finds and 
41. Short, supra note 33, at 634. 
42. Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 32 
[hereinafter Stille]. 
43.Id. 
44. Bator, supra note 12, at 293-294. 
45. "Looting" is the illegal excavation of ancient artifacts. It is a problem that 
runs rampant in Mediterranean countries. Areas rich in archaeological objects left 
by previous civilizations are being stripped clean by local residents who can make 
a sizable profit by selling these treasures on the black market. See generally 
Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16. 
46. See Bator, supra note 12, at 301. Bator states that the escalating prices 
paid for antiquities on the international art market stimulates the looting of ar-
chaeological sites. Id. 
47. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 17. For example, the Etruscan tombs north 
of Rome have been looted by such various groups including the ancient Romans, 
soldiers of the Napoleonic era and 19th century tourists. Id. 
48. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, 
at 20. See also Bator, supra note 12, at 318. 
49. "Clandestini" is the Italian nickname for those art thieves who dig up 
archaeological sites at night. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16. In the region 
around Rome these looters are called "tombaroli." Id. In South America they are 
known as "huaqueros." Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 
36, at 96. 
50. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 17. The looting at the archaeological sites in 
Sicily and north of Rome and Morgantina, is so severe the sites look as if they 
have been shelled due to the number of freshly dug holes. Id. at 16. 
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sell them outside the country, in violation of national export 
laws.51 Although no museum will buy an obviously stolen arti-
fact, Swiss dealers can successfully "launder" newly found and 
unrecorded objects by selling them to other dealers, collectors 
and museums without an export certificate. 52 Tragically, loot-
ers often destroy the historic and scientific value of an archaeo-
logical site with their reckless digging. 53 
B. EUROPEAN LAws REGARDING STOLEN ART AND CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 
Today, many European countries have laws regulating the 
export of cultural property.54 Some countries allow the export 
of cultural property upon review by a government committee, 
while others simply prohibit it entirely. 55 Some countries, 
51. Id. at 16. 
52. Id. Swiss law does not require the proof of the origin of a piece of art, or 
any export documents from the country it came from. Id. Once a piece is sold by 
a dealer, it is considered legitimate. See Montalbano, supra note 4. Furthermore, a 
stolen piece of art can be stored in a in Swiss bank vault for five years and come 
out with clear legal title to the possessor. Radcliffe, supra note 12. 
53. Thomas Maier, Nations Fight To Recover A Past They Say Was Plundered, 
NEWSDAY, May 23, 1995, B29 [hereinafter Maier, Nations Fight To Recover A Past 
They Say Was Plundered]. According to American archaeologist Martin McAllister, 
"archaeological sites are now like endangered species . . . systematically targeted 
and destroyed, and they can never be replaced. Once it's looted it's gone." Thomas 
Maier, History as an Endangered Species, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 29, 1995, p. 
1D [hereinafter Maier, History as an Endangered Species]. While sites in Turkey, 
Greece and Italy are suffering significant losses, American archaeological sites are 
not immune from looting, either. Id. Sites such as the Revolutionary War battle-
field in Saratoga, N.Y. and the ancient burial grounds of the Anasazi tribe in the 
Southwest are also being plundered of their historic objects and scientific value. 
Id. 
54. Richard Mastalir, A Propos~l for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property" 
Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDliAM INT'L L.J. 
1033, 1053 (1993) [hereinafter Mastalir]. Professors Merryman and Elsen catego-
rized national export laws into four different types: (1) laws which totally prohibit 
any exchange (Mexico and Guatemala); (2) laws which prohibit the export of desig-
nated objects of national importance (France and Italy); (3) laws which routinely 
award export licenses (Great Britain and Canada); and (4) laws with no limita-
tions on export (the United States). Id. 
55. Bator, supra note 12, at 315. The countries that allow the export of cultur-
al property based on government permission widely differ in their application of 
this type of policy. Id. Many governments appear to have a presumption against 
export and allow only unimportant items to leave the country. [d. England and 
Japan, however, award export certificates for all objects of cultural property, ex-
cept those which have special national importance. [d. 
9
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such as Italy and Greece, have state ownership laws that claim 
all "antiquities" as government property, including those pieces 
not yet unearthed. 56 Other countries enact export laws that 
require a governmental agency approve the export of cultural 
property by granting an "export certificate."57 This govern-
ment agency generally considers whether the object may be 
sold, traded or loaned to anyone outside of the country. 58 The 
agency then issues an export certificate to indicate governmen-
tal consent to the export of the object.59 Consequently, a mere 
showing that an object is illegally exported does not mean it is 
stolen.60 Even the lawful owner of a piece of cultural property 
commits a crime by transporting the object outside national 
borders if he or she does not have an export certificate.61 
Brazil, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China, Rus8ia and Zaire are countries 
that prohibit the export of cultural property. Id. at 315 n.73. "Cultural property" is 
typically defined to include virtually all noncontemporary art. Bator, supra note 
12, at 315. 
56. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16. However, governments that claim owner-
ship to all antiquities found in the ground are often not able to pay for objects 
discovered, motivating people to sell their finds on the black market. Walsh, supra 
note 28, at 88. Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Greece and Italy all claim state ownership 
to artifacts found in their soil. Id. However, if someone does find an artifact in 
those countries, the government will either confiscate their land to investigate 
further or take the object in exchange for minimal or no compensation. Id. These 
options encourage people to throw the objects away or sell them on the black 
market at a fraction of the amount it will sell for later. Id. 
If an Italian developer digs up an archaeological object at the site of a 
building project, the object is automatically property of the Italian government 
regardless of who owns the land. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultur-
al Objects, supra note 5, at 35. However, such discoveries are considered hazards 
of business since they result in interminable delays while the government investi-
gates the site and unforeseen expenses to accommodate the excavations. Id. Com-
monly, workmen are paid to keep quiet about the discovery and the antiquities 
are covered up, destroyed or sold on the black market. Id. 
57. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1175-76. 
58. See generally Pratt & O'Keefe, supra note 37. For example, in France such 
approval is given by the Minister of Cultural Affairs. Id. at 79. In Italy, the Min-
ister of National Education issues export certificates for cultural property. Id. at 
113. In the United Kingdom, if an Expert Adviser considers an object of "national 
importance," the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art gives public 
institutions a specified period of time to make a bid on the object. Id. at 225. If 
no bid is made, the Reviewing Committee normally grants the export certificate. 
Id. 
59. See generally Pratt & O'Keefe, supra note 37. 
60. Bator, supra note 12, at 286. 
61. John H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. No.3, 477, 483 n.14 (1988) [hereinafter Merryman, The Retention of Cultural 
Property J. A tourist is legally allowed to purchase a work of art in a source coun-
try, however national export restrictions may make it illegal to take the object 
10
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The civil codes of Western European countries provide that 
an original owner loses title to property stolen from him when 
the thief sells it to a bona fide purchaser.52 However, common 
law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United 
States follow the rule that the original owner retains superior 
title to his stolen property even if a third party innocently 
purchases it.53 To determine choice of law in multi-national 
matters, private international law observes the lex locus situs 
when he or she leaves the country. Id. Legal problems also ensue when a rightful 
owner decides to sell an object of cultural property. See Id. at n.15. For example, 
a Frenchman sold his Nicholas Poussin painting to a dealer. The dealer took the 
painting out of France without the requisite export certificate and sold it to the 
Cleveland Museum. Id. The French government demanded the return of the paint-
ing and when the museum resisted, the French sent out a warrant for the arrest 
of the museum's director. Id. After several years of dispute a compromis!l was 
reached. Id. The Cleveland Museum retained recognized ownership of the painting, 
while agreeing to lend it to the Louvre for a period of 25 years. Merryman, The 
Retention of Cultural Property, at 483 n.15. 
62. Collin, supra note 13, at 22. Article 1153 of the Italian Civil Code states: 
"He to whom movable property . . . is conveyed by one who is not the owner 
acquires ownership of it through possession, provided that he be in good faith at 
the moment of consignment and there be an instrument or transaction capable of 
transferring ownership . . . " Codice Civile C.C. art. 1153 (It.), cited in Vitrano, 
supra note 6, at 1173 n.63. 
The German Civil Code states: 
(1) A person, who has a movable thing in his proprietary 
possession for ten years acquires ownership (usucaption). 
(2) Usucaption is excluded, if the acquirer is not in good 
faith in obtaining possession or if he subsequently learns 
that he is not entitled to ownership. 
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB art. 937 (Ger.), translated in The German Civil Code 
(Fred B. Rothman 1975). 
The French Civil Code also gives superior property rights to a good faith 
possessor, except in two instances. Stephen Grover, The Need For Civil Law Na-
tions to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 
TEx. L. REV. 1431, 1451 (1992) (explaining C. CIV. art. 2279-2280 (Fr.». First, the 
original owner has a period of three years, from the time the chattel was stolen, 
during which he or she may recover stolen goods from a subsequent purchaser. Id. 
Second, Article 2280 provides a market overt exception, where if a good faith 
purchaser buys stolen or lost goods "in a market, at a public sale, or from a deal-
er in this particular type of goods," the original owner can recover them from the 
good faith purchaser in exchange for the purchase price paid. Id. 
A "bona fide purchaser" is "one who has purchased property for value with-
out any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
177 (6th ed. 1990). The principle that a bona fide purchaser holds superior title to 
the original owner is based upon Roman antecedents that sought to protect the 
integrity of transactions in personal property in Europe after the devastating 
plague had ended. Collin, supra note 13, at 22. 
63. Collin, supra note 13, at 21. This principle is known as nemo dat quod 
habet, meaning no one may give better title than he has. Id. at 21 n.28. 
11
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rule,54 This rule dictates that the law of the country where a 
transfer of personal property takes place governs the rights of 
those who claim title to it,65 Art thieves often take advantage 
of contrasting national laws and transfer stolen cultural prop-
erty from common-law to civil-law countries where the original 
title is extinguished when the item is sold,66 
Governments apply export laws and restrictions in varying 
degrees to control the kinds of objects allowed to leave the 
country,67 Many countries enact broad definitions of cultural 
64. [d. at 22. 
65. [d. 
66. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1167. According to Morris Collin: 
It is not lost on sophisticated traffickers that the situs 
rule, combined with bona fide purchaser laws in continen-
tal Europe, can prevail even against a rightful owner. 
These traffickers possess the contacts and capital to 
shoulder the costs of a transferring stolen art across bor-
ders in order to legitimate them. The lex locus situs rule 
permits the manipulation of stolen art in such a way that 
the goods will obtain market value, resulting in substan-
tial profits. 
Collin, supra note 13, at 24. 
67. See generally Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37. For example, Egypt prohibits 
the export of "antiquities." Law No. 117 of 1983, art. 1, cited in [d. at 70. Antiqui-
ties are defined as: 
[d. 
[alny movable or immovable property which is a product 
of any of the various civilizations or any of the arts, 
sciences, literatures and religions of the successive histori-
cal periods extending from prehistoric times to a point 
one hundred years ago and that has archaeological or 
historical value or significance as a relic of one of the 
various civilizations established in Egypt or related to it. 
It also includes human and animal remains from such 
periods. 
Greece restricts the export of movable or immovable antiquities. Act No. 
5351 of 24 August 1932, art. 2, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 89. 
These works include "architecture, sculpture, writings and any other works such as 
buildings, monuments, vases, aqueducts, roads, walls, statues, idols, art, inlaid 
mosaics, pottery, weapons, jewelry and any other works of whatever material in-
cluding precious stones and coins. It includes articles from the time of Christianity 
and from the Greek Middle Ages." [d. 
France prohibits the export of "classified" objects, which includes any object, 
whether movable or attached to immovable property, whose preservation is of 
"national, historic, artistic, scientific or technical interest." Law of 31 December 
1913, art. 21, 14, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 79. This also in-
cludes objects of national importance for historical or artistic reasons. Law of 32 
June 1941, art. 1, cited in [d. This applies to "items of furniture made before 
12
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property coupled with restrictive export laws to deter the theft 
and illegal export of cultural property.68 However, these laws 
often have an opposite effect and increase illegal trafficking by 
creating a wider range of illegal trade.69 Some authorities crit-
icize this approach, claiming the objects are damaged by re-
strictive exportation laws.70 For instance, many characterize a 
country's effort to guard its cultural treasures as an excuse for 
hoarding art.7l This "hoarding" results in huge amounts of art 
left undocumented, unprotected and hidden from view.72 The 
heavy restrictions on the flow of the legitimate art market 
create an increased demand for objects considered cultural 
property.73 As a consequence, these laws promote smuggling 
1830, works of painters, engravers, draughtsmen, sculptors and decorators made 
before 1900 and to objects resulting from excavations carried out in France or 
Algeria." Id. 
Italy considers objects of "artistic, historical, archaeological or ethnographical 
interest" except works of living authors or works less than 50 years old, to be 
objects of cultural property subject to export control. Law of 1 June 1939 XVI, No. 
1089, art. 1, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 113. No object of cultural 
property is to be exported without an export license. Id. at art. 36. 
Spain prohibits the export of cultural property without an export license. 
This includes immovable and movable objects of artistic, palaeontological, archaeo-
logical, ethnographic, scientific or technical interest including the documentary and 
bibliographical heritage. Law 13/1985 of 25 June 1985, arts. 1, 5, cited in Prott & 
O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 197. 
The United States restricts the export of "archaeological resources." These 
are defined as any material remains of past human life or activities which are of 
archaeological interest and includes pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon 
projectiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, 
rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials or parts of any of these 
items. All items must be at least 100 years old. Archaeological Resources Protec-
tion Act 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (Supp. 1982), cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra 
note 37, at 226. 
68. See Mary McKenna, Problematic Provenance: Toward a Coherent United 
States Policy on the International Trade in Cultural Property, 12 U. PA. J.INT'L 
BuS. L. 83, 94 (1991). 
69. Id. "The exponential increase in illegal trafficking in cultural property 
reflects not just a surge in activity among art thieves and smugglers, but an ex-
panded concept of 'illicit trade'." Id. 
70. John H. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a 
Common Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 757, 758-59 (1983) Accord-
ing to Professor Merryman, "the indiscriminate and insensitive use of export con-
trols for this purpose may actually hinder rather than advance the interests that 
their proponents rightly want to protect." Merryman, A Licit Trade in Cultural 
Objects, supra note 5, at 25. 
71. Merryman, A Licit Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, at 19. 
72. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Com-
mon Cultural Heritage, supra note 70, at 758. 
73. Bator, supra note 12, at 318. According to Paul Bator, "the international 
13
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and an active black market trade of cultural property to satisfy 
that demand.74 
Each country has its own laws that specify which objects 
constitute cultural property and, therefore, may not be export-
ed.75 "Art source" countries76 have an abundance of cultural 
property and, therefore, more restrictive export policies.77 In 
general, these countries strongly oppose the export of cultural 
objects,78 reasoning that their strict export laws protect the 
physical safety of these objects and prevent the destruction of 
the records of earlier civilizations.79 An economic interest also 
promotes restrictive export policies because famous pieces 
promote tourism.80 National pride and identity are often con-
nected to a country's cultural treasures.81 Furthermore, in 
southern European countries, the government and the church, 
the most prominent art patrons, favor keeping national art 
within the state.82 
black market thrives because no alternative exists for either buyers or sellers, all 
economic incentives are pushed in favor of the illegal trade.· Id. The harder to 
obtain an item, the higher the demand for it on the black market. Id. 
74. See Id. 
75. See generally Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37. Under the UNESCO Conven-
tion, each signatory state must initiate its own laws regulating the trade of cultur-
al property and implementing the provisions of the Convention. UNESCO Conven-
tion, arts. 8 and 10. 
Article 8 states: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to impose 
penalties or administrative sanctions on any person responsible for infringing the 
prohibitions referred to under articles 6(b) and 7(b) above. 
Article 10 states: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to restrict by 
education, information and vigilance, movement of cultural property illegally re-
moved from any State Party to this Convention . . . • 
76. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 61, at 479 n.5. 
See Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1036. Countries which export large amounts of art 
and artifacts are commonly classified as "art rich," "art source," "countries of ori-
gin," and "artifact-rich." Id. These typically include Italy, Greece, Turkey, Eastern 
Europe, Africa and Oceania. Collin, supra note 13, at 19. 
77. John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 
AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 832 (1986) [hereinafter Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking 
About Cultural Property J. Most source countries attempt to retain art and artifacts 
within their borders through national laws prohibiting the export of all objects 
falling under the definition of "cultural property" or severely restricting their ex-
port by requiring government permission for export. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1044. 
80.Id. 
81. Short, supra note 33, at 659. 
82. Id. at 658. 
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In contrast, the laws of "art importing" or "art poor"83 
nations encourage a more active art trade.54 These countries 
often want to enrich their own cultural patrimony through 
international sources.85 Art importing nations also seek to 
protect the "good faith purchasers" within their borders who do 
not want to surrender possession of an object or be deprived of 
compensation.86 These nations contend that art should flow 
where it is appreciated so it can be preserved and used for 
archaeological research.87 Furthermore, these nations assert 
that a free art trade allows for a more appropriate display, 
storage and conservation of art works, since many art source 
nations do not possess the financial resources to care for their 
overwhelming collections.88 Therefore, many works are kept 
eternally in storage, hidden from view, because the best exam-
ples of a particular artist, school or era are already on display 
within the state.89 
Despite the myriad of present export laws, an art-import-
ing nation is not required to comply with another country's 
restrictions on the export of cultural property.90 No person 
can bring an actionable claim against either the person who 
brought the work into the country or the party that later ac-
quired possession of the work merely on the basis of its illegal 
export.91 Therefore, the illegal export from one country gener-
ally does not bar lawful import into the major art market na-
tions such as the United States, England, France, Germany 
83. "Art poor" and "art importing" nations include Canada, the United States 
and Great Britain. See Jessica L. Darraby, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNA· 
TIONAL TRADE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: DUTIES OF COLLECTORS, TRADERS AND 
CLAIMANTS, PRACTICING LAw INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK, PLI Order No. G4-3851, July 12, 1990, at 
659, available on Westlaw [hereinafter Darraby]. "The source nations have the 
cultural property and the retention laws. The market nations are the ones to 
which the cultural property would be likely to go if the retention laws did not 
exist or were evaded. Clearly, a nation may be both a source and a market." 
Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36, at 65 n.5. 
84. See generally Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36, 
at 65 n.5. 
85. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1044. 
86.ld. 
87.ld. 
88. Short, supra note 33, at 659. 
89. ld. at 660. 
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and Switzerland.92 
C. THE UNESCO CONVENTION AND OTHER ACCORDS AIMED AT 
CURBING THE ILLICIT ART MARKET 
Various international accords were created to remedy defi-
cient national laws regarding the international traffic of stolen 
art.93 Three main pieces of legislation have attempted to curb 
the illicit trade of cultural property.94 The first major interna-
tional agreement was the UNESCO Convention of 1970.95 The 
second important piece of legislation, the United States Cultur-
al Property Implementation Act of 1983,96 was enacted by the 
United States government to implement the UNESCO Conven-
tion.97 In 1993, the European Union passed the third signifi-
cant form of cultural property legislation, the EC Directive and 
Regulation.98 
1. Provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
Since 1970, the "UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property" (hereinafter 
"UNESCO Convention") has been the primary document for 
restricting the illegal trafficking of art and cultural proper-
ty.99 The UNESCO Convention was based primarily on public 
92.Id. 
93. See infra notes 99 - 198 and accompanying text. 
94. Id. 
95. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39. See infra notes 99-130. 
96. See infra notes 131-148. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation 
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter CPIA]. 
97. Maritza F. Bolano, International Art Theft Disputes: Harmonizing Common 
Law Principles with Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 129, 134 (1991/1992) [hereinafter Bolano]. 
98. See infra notes 166-191 and accompanying text. 
Council Directive on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed 
from the Territory of a Member State, March 15, 1993 O.J. (L 74174) (hereinafter 
EC Directive). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3911/92 of December 1992 on the Export of 
Cultural Goods, 1992 O.J. (L 395/1) (hereinafter EC Regulation). 
99. Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property (pt. 1), N.Y. 
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international law and administrative law.lOo UNESCO Con-
vention, like the export laws of most source nations, is based 
on the premise that illicit traffic of cultural property can be re-
duced by implementing more extensive legal controls. 101 
The UNESCO Convention requires, under Article 6, that a 
country exporting an object of cultural property provide an 
export certificate. l02 This requirement abolishes the right of 
an art importing country to decide for itself what types of ex-
port controls it wishes to enforce. 103 The United States 
strongly opposed this provision because it required giving 
"blank check"l04 credit to a multitude of foreign export 
laws. lOS As a result, the United States signed the UNESCO 
Convention with a formal reservation to Article 6.106 
One of the most difficult provisions of the Convention to 
implement is Article 7, which requires the return of stolen 
cultural property and payment of restitution to the bona-fide 
purchaser. 107 Under Article 7(a), the signatory states to the 
Convention are obligated to prevent their "museums and simi-
lar institutions" from acquiring illegally exported works of 
art. 108 However, the Convention qualifies this obligation by 
LAw JOURNAL, March 3, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter Hoffmanl. 
100. Id. 
101. Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36, at 95 n.S7. 
102. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 6. Article 6 of the UNESCO 
Convention provides: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to introduce 
an appropriate export certificate in which the exporting State would specify that 
the export of the cultural property in question is authorized. The certificate should 
accompany all items of cultural property exported in accordance with the regula-
tion." Id. 
103. Bator, supra note 12, at 377. 
104. "Blank check" enforcement of another country's export laws prohibits the 
import of cultural property without judging whether these laws are consistent with 
United States substantive policies or interests. Id. at 32S. 
105. Id. at 377. As a rule, the United States opposes giving any form of "blank 
check" to foreign nations by prohibiting the import of cultural property based on 
foreign export laws without judging whether these laws are consistent with its 
substantive policies or interests. Id. at 32S. This would only serve to promote the 
existing tendency of art source countries to place an embargo on virtually all art. 
Id. at 329. 
106. Bator, supra note 12, at 377. The United States reserved the "right to 
determine whether or not to impose export controls over cultural property." Id. 
107. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5. 
lOS. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(a). Article 7(a) of the 
UNESCO Convention provides in pertinent part: 
17
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requiring its enforcement only to the extent that national legis-
lation would impose the same.109 Consequently, this clause 
enables countries, like the United States, to allow museums to 
acquire illegally exported works of art. 110 
The UNESCO Convention limits the return of cultural 
objectslll to those stolen specifically from a museum, church 
or similar institution.112 Article 7(b)(ii) provides for the resti-
tution of an illegally exported object on the payment of just 
compensation to the bona-fide purchaser. 113 Since the Con-
vention is treated as a federal treaty, this provision creates a 
basis for foreign claimants to file suit for recovery under feder-
al law when state property law would not provide a reme-
The States Parties to the Convention undertake [t]o take 
the necessary measures, consistent with national legisla. 
tion, to prevent museums and similar institutions within 
their territories from acquiring cultural property originat· 
ing in another State Party which has been illegally ex-
ported after entry into force of this Convention, in the 
States concerned. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
109. Id. 
110. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 484-485. According to this clause, any country 
that does not recognize foreign export restrictions is exempt from returning illegal-
ly exported works of art. Id. 
111. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. The UNESCO Convention 
defines "cultural property" as "property which, on religious or secular grounds 
is ... of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science." 
Id. However, each State is left to designate the specific items it considers cultural 
property. Id. 
Id. 
112. Id. art. 7(b). Under Article 7(b), parties will undertake: 
(i) [T]o prohibit the import of cultural property stolen 
from a museum or a religious or secular public monument 
or similar institution in another State Party to this Con-
vention after the entry into force of this Convention for 
the States concerned, provided that such property is docu-
mented as appertaining to the inventory of that institu-
tion; 
113. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b)(ii). Under the relevant 
provisions in Article 7(b), parties will undertake: 
Id. 
(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take 
appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural 
property imported after entry into force of this Convention 
in both States concerned, provided, however, that the 
resulting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent 
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that prop-
erty. 
18
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dy.1l4 However, Article 7(b)(ii) can be invoked only by a mu-
seum, a religious or secular public monument or similar insti-
tution which had documented its possession of the object before 
the theft occurred.115 Therefore, the UNESCO Convention af-
fords no remedy for a private individual or institution that has 
suffered a similar theft. 116 
Another provision of the UNESCO Convention allows 
signatory nations to call upon each other in emergency situa-
tions and enforce each other's cultural property laws. ll7 Spe-
cifically, Article 9 provides for the ad hoc application of import 
controls on specific archaeological and ethnological materials 
where pillage of these objects has jeopardized a country's· na-
tional patrimony. us However, Article 9 only calls for signato-
ry states to make a concerted effort to carry out the "necessary 
concrete measures" to protect the pillaged objects rather than 
requiring blanket import restrictions. 119 The United States 
was one of thirteen countries that urged the adoption of Article 
9 as a substitute for the ''blank check" approach of automati-
cally enforcing the export laws of every foreign nation.120 This 
"crisis provision" encourages action when a cultural patrimony 
is in serious danger.121 
114. Bator, supra note 12, at 382-83. Furthennore, the U.S. government is obli-
gated to aid in effectuating the seizure and return of stolen art. [d. at 382. 
115. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b)(i). 
116. See [d. 
117. [d. at art. 9. 
118. Bator, supra note 12, at 340. Article 9 provides that: 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patri-
mony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or eth-
nological materials may call upon other States Parties 
who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention 
undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a 
concerted international effort to determine and to carry 
out the necessary concrete measures, including the control 
of exports and imports and international commerce in the 
specific material concerned. Pending agreement each State 
concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent 
feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural 
heritage of the requesting State. 
UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 9. 
119. Bator, supra note 12, at 340. 
120. [d. at 399 
121. [d. at 340. Bator states that the two types of pillage contemplated are, 
"the case in which the remains of a particular civilization are threatened with 
destruction or wholesale removal . . . and the case in which the international 
19
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The UNESCO Convention has aroused some criticism. For 
example, respected authorities have argued that the UNESCO 
Convention places more importance on national hoarding than 
on the international protection of art and cultural property. 122 
By condoning state ownership laws and restrictive export con-
trols, these critics contend that the UNESCO Convention al-
lows innumerable objects to remain "undocumented, unhoused, 
unprotected, and undiscovered . . . ,,123 The provisions for re-
solving disputes are biased toward art source nations since the 
litigation costs are allocated "almost exclusively" to the art 
importing nations that act as the venue for claims for the re-
turn of cultural property.124 Furthermore, the UNESCO Con-
vention fails to harmonize the multitude of national laws ad-
dressing the transferability of title of stolen property or proce-
dural rules regarding burden of proof. 125 
The UNESCO Convention's most serious problem remains 
that many of the principal art market countries that would be 
affected by the accord are not signatories to it.126 The United 
market for certain items has stimulated the widespread illegal excavations destruc-
tive of important archaeological resources." Id. 
122. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1045, n.33. According to Professor Merryman, 
the UNESCO Convention appears to be based on a principle of "cultural national-
ism" that places more importance on national hoarding than on international pro-
tection of cultural property. Id. 
123. Id. at 1055. 
124. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note: The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Pro-
posed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 389 (1995) [hereinafter Borodkin). 
125. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. In common law countries, a seller cannot 
transfer better title than he or she has. See Id. Therefore even a good faith pur-
chaser can never obtain good title from a thief. See Id. In civil law countries, if a 
buyer purchases a piece of art in good faith that it was not stolen, he or she 
acquires good title and has the right to keep the art. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 
1166. 
126. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1054. M9jor art-importing nations which have 
refused to sign the UNESCO Convention include France, Germany, Japan, The 
Netherlands, the Scandinavian nations, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. John 
H. Merryman & James A.R. Nafziger, The Private International Law of Cultural 
Property in the United States, AM. J. COMPo L., 221, 242 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter 
Merryman & Nafziger]. This problem is significant due to the lex situs rule, name-
ly that the law of the country where the transfer of stolen property took place 
governs any suit for the return of that property. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. 
The UNESCO Convention is clearly inapplicable in an enormous number of cases 
since "more than 80% of the antiquities trade takes place in non-signatory na-
tions." Harold Burman, executive director of the US Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private International Law and the State Department representative 
on the three-member U.S. delegation to UNIDROIT, quoted in Id. 
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Kingdom refused to sign the UNESCO Convention because its 
definition of cultural property is over-inclusive, interferes with 
rights of ownership, and the requirements on art dealers are 
unnecessarily bureaucratic. 127 Several countries find the 
UNESCO Convention conflicts with other umbrella agreements 
regarding free trade. 128 The United States ratified the 
UNESCO Convention in 1972 but waited ten years before 
implementing its provisions with the passage of the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act in 1983.129 Although over 80 
nations ratified the UNESCO Convention, only six art import-
ing nations have signed the treaty and adopted legislation for 
its implementation.130 
2. United States Implementation of the UNESCO Convention: 
Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983 
The United States' Cultural Property Implementation Act 
of 1983131 (hereinafter "the CPIA") effected legislation corre-
sponding with Articles 7 and 9 of the UNESCO Conven-
tion. 132 Through the CPIA, Congress aimed to prevent the im-
portation of stolen cultural property from other nations and 
facilitate legal actions by foreign governments for the return of 
cultural property.133 The CPIA enables the President of the 
United States to enter into a bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment with other nations to implement import restrictions on 
artifacts that are in danger of destruction. 
127. Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property (pt.2), N.Y. 
LAw JOURNAL, March 10, 1995, 5, 11. 
128. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1054. 
129. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 485. This ten year delay is attributed to a battle 
in Congress involving those who favored the protective efforts of the Convention 
(i.e art historians and archaeologists) and those who disagreed with the measures 
used by it (i.e. art dealers). Id. at 485-86. 
130. Hoffman, supra note 98, at 7. These countries include Argentina, Australia, 
Cansda, Italy, the United States and Switzerland. Id. 
131. 19 U.S.C. §2601-2613, supra note 96. 
132. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10. 
133. Bolano, supra note 97, at 134. The CPIA is designed to "prohibit the im-
portation of stolen cultural property from the institutions of other signatory na-
tions, to assist in the recovery of cultural property, to exercise import controls. 
over cultural property, and to facilitate legal actions to recover cultural property 
upon request by a State Party." Id. 
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Section 2606 of the CPIA explicitly implements Article 7 of 
the UNESCO Convention, providing protection for stolen cul-
tural property.l34 The CPIA enforces Article 7 by requiring 
importers to obtain an export certificate from the source coun-
try for any work of art qualifying as "archaeological or ethno-
logical material."135 However, this protection applies only to 
stolen cultural property within the definition of the UNESCO 
Convention,136 property that has been inventoried and is ap-
purtenant to a foreign museum, religious or secular institution 
or public monument. 137 The CPIA does not specifically per-
tain to artifacts, either lawfully excavated or looted, if they do 
not "appertain" to the inventory of an appropriate institution 
at the time of theft.138 Furthermore, the CPIA applies only to 
cultural property stolen after the statute's effective date, Janu-
ary 12, 1983, or after the date that a State Party enters into a 
reciprocal agreement with the United States, whichever is 
later. 139 
Section 2602 explicitly implements Article 9 by inviting 
signatory governments to the UNESCO Convention to call 
upon the President of the United States for aid in recovering 
documented stolen cultural property, pursuant to a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement. l40 At the request of a foreign coun-
try, the U.S. Customs Service can enforce that nation's export 
laws within the United States by seizing designated archaeo-
logical or ethnological material if the importer is unable to 
present an export certificate. 141 However, in order to enter 
into a bilateral agreement to obtain this assistance, the re-
questing nation must meet complicated preconditions to prove 
134. See Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10. 
135. 19 U.S.C. §2606 (1995). The Act only considers objects which are over 250 
years old to be of "archaeological interest" and subject to import restrictions. 19 
U.S.C. § 2601(2) (Supp. 1994). 
136. See supra note 111, citing the UNESCO Convention's definition of cultural 
property. 
137. 19 u.S.C. § 2607 (1995). 
138. Darraby, supra note 83. 
139. 19 U.S.C. §2607 (1995). 
140. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1995). 
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1995). However, an importer is excused from presenting 
an export certificate to U.S. Customs officials if there is "satisfactory evidence" 
that the material was exported from the State Party at least ten years before the 
date of importation and that the importer has not owned it for more than one 
year. [d. 
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import restrictions are necessary. 142 To date, the United 
States has entered into a bilateral treaty with Mexico,l43 and 
executive agreements with Ecuador,144 Guatemala,14s 
Peru/46 Bolivia147 and El Salvador.l46 
The United States has not resolved the fundamental issue 
of what constitutes a "stolen" object for the purposes of imple-
menting import restrictions or providing for the return of cul-
tural property.149 The leading case regarding claims of owner-
ship of cultural property by foreign countries is U.S. v. 
McClain. 1so In McClain, an art dealer knowingly excavated 
pre-Columbian artifacts in violation of Mexican law, subse-
quently smuggling them into the United States and selling 
them. 151 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the con-
viction of four American citizens for conspiring to receive and 
transport unregistered artifacts through interstate commerce, 
142. Darraby, supra note 83. Under the CPIA, the requesting state must prove 
1) its cultural patrimony is in jeopardy due to the pillage of archaeological or 
ethnological materials; 2) it has already taken measures to protect the cultural 
patrimony; 3) the requested restrictions would provide a "substantial benefit" in 
preventing a "serious situation of pillage" if other nations that have a significant 
import trade in such archaeological or ethnological material apply similar restric-
tions within a reasonable amount of time; 4) less drastic remedies are not avail-
able and 5) the import restrictions are consistent with the general interest of the 
international community. [d. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1995). 
143. See Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeo-
logical, Historical, and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 22 U.S.T. 
494. 
144. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Ecuador for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and 
Cultural Properties, Nov. 17, 1983, U.S.-Ecuador, T.I.A.S. No. 11,075. 
145. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Guatemala for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and 
Cultural Properties, May 21, 1984, U.S.-Guat., T.I.A.S. No. 11,077. 
146. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Peru for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultur-
al Properties, Sept. 15, 1991, U.S.-Peru., 33 U.S.T. 1607. 
147. The United States granted Bolivia's request for protection of antique cere-
monial textiles form Coroma, Bolivia. See Import Restrictions on Cultural Textile 
Artifacts from Bolivia, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,61819 (1989). 
148. The United States agreed to grant protection to pre-Hispanic artifacts from 
EI Salvador's Cara Sucia Archaeological Region. See Import Restrictions on Archae-
ological Material from EI Salvador, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,61416 (1987). 
149. Darraby, supra note 83. No American statute, including the National Sto-
len Property Act (NSPA) and CPIA, defines what constitutes "stolen." [d. 
150. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). 
151. [d. at 993. 
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under the National Stolen Property Act (hereinafter 
"NSPA,,).152 
The McClain court relied on Mexican law to determine 
that the artifacts had been "stolen," thereby finding a violation 
of the NSP A. 153 Therefore, pursuant to McClain, an object 
will be considered "stolen" if a nation's law clearly declares 
national ownership of cultural goods. 154 The McClain holding 
eliminates the distinction between "stolen" and "illegally ex-
ported" cultural property.155 The ruling also contradicts the 
long-standing U.S. policy of opposition to agreements that give 
foreign nations the right to prosecute U.S. citizens according to 
their nation's legislation regarding cultural property.156 De-
spite its controversial implications, McClain has not been suc-
cessfully applied in a replevin action since its decision in 
1977.157 Furthermore, the decision is not binding outside the 
Fifth Circuit or in an international law context. 15S After 
McClain, the United States courts have made it very difficult 
for foreign governments seeking the return of cultural property 
to prove ownership.159 
In order to obtain the return of cultural property, the 
United States requires a government to establish and prove 
that the object was found or excavated at a site within its 
territory.160 It must also show that its laws vested the state 
with ownership at the time of the removal. 161 In the case Pe-
ru v. Johnson,162 the Peruvian government filed a civil action 
in the Federal District Court in California for the return of 
152. Id. at 992. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2320. 
153. Merryman & Nafziger, supra note 126, at 228. 
154. Claudia Fox, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects; An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 225, 234 (1993) [hereinafter Fox]. 
155. [d. 
156. Id. at 235. 
157. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10. 
158. Darraby, supra note 83. 
159. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10. 
160. Id. 
161. [d. at 10. Governments that have failed to meet the McClain proof of 
ownership requirements include Peru, which sought the return of artifacts it 
claimed were stolen from the Sipan tomb in 1986, and Croatia and Hungary 
which tried to recover the "Sevso Treasure." Id. 
162. Government of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
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some artifacts it claimed had been illegally exported.163 How-
ever, the court found that Peru failed to prove that these arti-
facts actually carne from Peru or that Peruvian law vested title 
in the State at the time of export. 164 
3. The European Community's Alternative to the UNESCO 
Convention: The EC Regulation and Directive Regarding 
Cultural Property165 
As a consequence of encouraging free trade among the 
member states, the enforcement of export restrictions on cul-
tural property and the detection of stolen art objects has be-
come more difficult. 166 Therefore, efforts to unify the Europe-
an states have actually facilitated art theft within the Europe-
an Union. 167 In 1993, the European Community (hereinafter 
"EC") eliminated internal border checks and terminated pass-
port verification of people passing from one EC member state 
to another in accordance with Article 8A of the EEC Trea-
ty.16S Baggage checks are no longer done for travel by land, 
air or sea within the internal borders of the EC.169 As a re-
sult, a thief smuggling a work of art from one European mem-
ber state to another no longer has to worry about being 
stopped and searched at the border. 170 In addition, the inter-
163. Id. at 811. 
164. Id. at 812-14. 
165. See infra n.97. 
166. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30. 
167. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30. Florence Hardinge, marketing director of 
the Art Loss Register stated, " . . . art has become a movable currency and as the 
barriers come down, this will be easier because there will be no customs control. n 
Id. 
The Art Loss Register is a London based private organization that aims to 
deter art theft by working with insurance companies and the fine art industry to 
register photographs and descriptions of valuable art in an international computer 
database. See Radcliffe, supra note 12. 
168. Short, supra note 33, at 643. Article 8A of the EEC Treaty provides: 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal market over a 
period expiring on 31 December 1992 .... the internal 
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions 
of this Treaty. 
cited in Id. at 641 n.44. 
169. Id. at 643. 
170. See generally Godfrey Barker, Downtown Goes Out of Town Round-up, THE 
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national black market,171 a network of art dealers who laun-
der illicit art, can move works of art very quickly. 172 
In response to growing concerns over increased art theft, 
the Member States of the European Union implemented a 
Regulation (hereinafter "Regulation") and a Directive (herein-
after "Directive") regarding the export of cultural property.173 
The EEC Treaty permits restrictions on import and export for 
the protection of national art treasures. 174 According to Arti-
cle 36, each member state may pass its own legislation to pro-
tect its "national treasures," thereby giving authority for the 
Regulation and Directive.175 However, since the EEC Treaty 
is based on the principle of free trade, Article 36 specifically 
prohibits measures which claim to protect cultural property 
but in fact merely act to restrict intra-community trade. 176 
The Regulation requires that any object of cultural proper-
ty being removed from the European Community be accompa-
nied by an export certificate.177 The definition of what consti-
tutes "cultural property" is left to the individual Member 
States and has been broadly construed.17s In addition, the 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 30, 1994 at 16, quoting James Emson of Art Loss Regis-
ter. Emson states, "stolen goods can be spirited out of the country very quickly 
and easily now the boundaries are down in Europe." Id. 
171. The black market of cultural property is a highly complex and organized 
system made up of local and foreign dealers. Bator, supra note 12, at 292. Corrupt 
and inefficient local officials permit the transport of art out of the country by 
automobile, train, plane and helicopter. Id. 
172. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 4. Jean-Michel Mimerand, director of the Office for 
Repression of Art Thefts, in Paris explains that "criminal networks are well orga-
nized to get the merchandise out to transit countries very quickly." Id. 
173. EC Regulation, supra note 98; EC Directive, supra note 98. 
174. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 36. Article 36 states that the Treaty 
provisions eliminating trade restrictions between the Member States "shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit justi-
fies on the grounds of . . . the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value . . . " Id. 
175. Id. Article 36 provides: "The provisions of Article 30 and 34 shall not pre-
clude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit [to pro-
tect] . .. national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological val-
ue ... " Id. 
176. Id. Article 36 concludes by providing: "Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States." Id. 
177. EC Regulation, supra note 98. 
178. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, 
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Annex to the Regulation provides a list of categories to which 
the EC Member States agree the Regulation will apply. 179 
The Regulation is based on the premise that by requiring ex-
port certificates to accompany objects of cultural property leav-
ing the EC, Member States will be able to show that an object 
was illegally exported if the purchaser of an object cannot 
produce the certificate. ISO Nevertheless, since the Regulation 
did not take effect until January 1, 1993, a significant number 
of objects exported before that date will not have the export 
certificate that is now required. 181 Therefore, despite the 
Regulation's intentions, a Member State will not be able to 
prove that the purchaser obtained an object in bad faith based 
merely on the absence of an export certificate. 182 
The Directive establishes the legal procedures for the re-
turn of cultural property that has been illegally exported from 
one EC Member State into another.l83 The Directive also per-
mits a Member State to request the return of a cultural object 
that is found in the territory of another Member State. l84 Up-
on such a request, the latter must either act to preserve the 
object, prevent any action to evade the return procedure or act 
as an intermediary between the possessor and the requesting 
Member State. l85 The Directive does not distinguish between 
"stolen" and "illegally exported" and applies only to "national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic, or archaeological val-
ue."I86 Only national governments are permitted to bring suit 
at 16. 
179. EC Regulation, supra note 98, at art. 1. The Regulation's Preamble states 
the Annex "is aimed at making clear categories of cultural goods which should be 
given particular protection in trade with third countries, but is not intended to 
prejudice the definition, by Member States, of national treasures within the mean-
ing of Article 36 of the Treaty . . . " [d. at preamble. 
180. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1195. 
181. [d. at 1196. 
182. [d. 
183. EC Directive, supra note 98. 
184. [d. art. 4. 
185. [d. However, according to J.L. Hill of Farrer & Co., a solicitor specializing 
in cultural property in the United Kingdom, the Directive's procedures for the 
return of cultural property have been criticized for being too bureaucratic to imple-
ment. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. 
186. EC Directive, supra note 98, art. 1. The EC Directive requires that an 
object 1) be a national treasure as defined by the Member State's own laws, 2) fit 
within one of the acknowledged categories of art, and 3) have been exported from 
an EC Member State after January 1, 1993. [d. art. 1 and 13. 
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against the possessor of a stolen object for its return, and the 
action must be brought within one year of discovering the 
object's location or identity of its possessor.187 The Directive 
also requires the requesting State to provide fair compensation 
provision to the dispossessed owner if he or she exercised due 
diligence in acquiring the object. 188 
From the standpoint of art market nations, the Regulation 
and Directive appear to inhibit the export of cultural property 
from the European Community by providing the "unconditional 
Community enforcement of the export controls of each of the 
member nations. "189 In effect, the Regulation and Directive 
impose the export controls of each EC Member State on art 
importing nations around the world. 190 Even within the Euro-
pean Community there is concern that the broad definitions of 
"cultural property" that countries such as Italy maintain are 
actually a pretext for restricting trade and a clear violation of 
Article 36.191 
The need for strong, uniform legislation to resolve issues 
related to stolen cultural property has become increasingly 
apparent,192 and although the UNESCO Convention was de-
signed to control the trafficking of illegally exported or stolen 
cultural property, the Convention has been largely ineffec-
tive. 193 The myriad of laws and legislation established by in-
dividual countries only further complicates matters.l94 Mean-
187. Id. art. 7.1. Restitution proceedings must be undertaken not more than 
thirty years after the object has been illegally exported from the Member State 
which is seeking restitution. Id. However, the requesting state has a seventy-five 
year period in which to request the return of an object belonging to a public col-
lection. Id. 
188. EC Directive, supra note 98, at arts. 9-11. 
189. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, 
at 16. 
190. Id. 
191. Collin, supra note 13, at 39. 
192. See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text discussing the problems of 
private theft and looting. 
193. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. Georgina Adam describes the UNESCO 
Convention as ~spectacularly unsuccessful" in facilitating the return of lost and 
smuggled art. Georgina Adam, They're Out To Steal Our Stolen Art, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, May 22, 1995, at 16 [hereinafter Adam). 
194. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. Hoffman states, ~In part, the lack of harmo· 
ny of national laws on the transferability of title to property sold by a thief, as 
well as substantive law and procedural rules allocation burden of proof facilitates 
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while no exhaustive compilation of national cultural property 
export laws exists. 195 To remedy the deficiencies that caused 
the UNESCO Convention to be futile, UNESCO requested that 
UNIDROIT196 draft a new international accord ·addressing 
the problems of illicit art theft. 197 The final draft of the 
UNIDROIT Convention was adopted in June 1995.198 
III. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION 
The escalating problem of illegal art trafficking and the 
difficulties of implementing the UNESCO Convention's restitu-
tion provisions prompted the drafting of a new international 
treaty, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects (hereinafter ''UNIDROIT Conven-
tion,,).199 In comparing the UNIDROIT Convention to its pre-
decessor, UNIDROIT aims to remedy UNESCO's deficien-
cies.20o In addition, UNIDROIT attempts to establish a uni-
fied private law code for resolving international claims de-
manding the restitution of stolen cultural objects and the re-
turn of illegally exported objects.201 In doing so, the 
UNIDROIT Convention seeks to harmonize civil law and com-
mon law property principles in order to maximize the number 
of nations signing the Convention.202 The UNIDROIT Con-
vention will be open for signature until June 30, 1996.203 
the laundering of and illicit trade in 8tolen art and antiquities." [d. 
195. Darraby, supra note 83. 
196. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5. UNIDROIT, a French term meaning "one 
law," is an acronym for the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law, an international organization based in Rome which is working to create a 
uniform system of law within the European Union. [d. 
197. Adam, supra note 193, at 16. 
198. Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft 
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or lllegally Exported 
Cultural Objects, May 24, 1995, 3 n.15. International diplomatic officials adopted 
the UNIDROIT Convention on June 23, 1995, at a UNIDROIT Conference in 
Rome. [d. 
199. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5. 
200. [d. at 7. 
201. [d. at 10. 
202. Fox, supra note 154, at 231. 
203. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 11. Pursuant to Article 11, 
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A. CLAIMS FOR CULTURAL PROPERTy204 UNDER THE 
UNIDROIT CONVENTION 
Claims for cultural property under the UNIDROIT Con-
vention differ in two ways from the UNESCO Convention. 
First, the UNIDROIT Convention uses private international 
law.205 Second, while the UNESCO Convention only provides 
for claims brought from signatory governments to other signa-
tory governments, the UNIDROIT Convention implies that 
private parties are allowed to bring suit in the court of another 
signatory nation for the return of stolen artwork.206 
The UNIDROIT Convention institutes the common law 
principle that "stolen" articles of cultural property should be 
returned to their true owner. 207 This provision opposes the 
civil law notion that one who innocently purchases a stolen 
object as a bona fide purchaser is released from returning 
it.208 Under Article 3, the claimant must bring an action for 
restitution for an object stolen from a private collection within 
three years from the time they know or reasonably should 
have known the location of the object and the identity of its 
possessor.209 Representatives for public collections have a 75-
204. [d. at art. 2. Article 2 provides: "For the purposes of this Convention, 
cultural objects are those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance 
for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science . . . " [d. These are 
the same as those listed in Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention. See UNESCO 
Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. This broad definition leaves the courts to 
detennine whether a work of art is of requisite importance to be returned to its 
true owner under the Convention. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 495. 
205. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 492. 
206. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. Pursuant to Article 7(b), the UNESCO 
Convention only gives rise to claims made by a museum, church or similar institu-
tion. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b). 
207. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3. Article 3.1 states, "The 
possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it." [d. 
208. Collin, supra note 13, at 22. 
209. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note lO, art. 3. Article 3.3 provides: "Any 
claim for restitution shall be brought within a period of three years from the time 
when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its 
possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the time of the 
theft." [d. 
UNIDROIT imposed a statute of limitations as an incentive to art importing 
nations to make them exempt from suits for the recovery of stolen art and archae-
ological objects after specific period of time. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. How-
ever, the implementation of the "discovery rule" is a concession to art source na-
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year period to reclaim any stolen property.210 However, there 
is concern that a statute of limitations will allow the possess-
ors of stolen cultural property to hide these objects until the 
time period has run.211 
B. REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THE DISPOSSESSED 
OWNER 
To attract art importing nations, the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion provides for reasonable compensation for the dispossessed 
owner of stolen cultural property.212 However, to receive such 
compensation, art purchasers have the responsibility of exer-
cising "due diligence" in verifying that the works they are 
buying are not stolen or illicit.213 Under Article 4.1, the pos-
sessor of stolen cultural property is provided "fair and reason-
tions who seek the longest period of time in which to bring a claim for the recov-
ery of stolen cultural property. See ld. 
210. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.5. Article 3.5 provides: 
[a]ny Contracting State may declare that a claim is sub-
ld. 
ject to a time limitation of 75 years or such longer period 
as is provided in its law. A claim made in another Con-
tracting State for restitution of a cultural object displaced 
from a monument, archaeological site or public collection 
in a Contracting State making such a declaration shall 
also be subject to that time limitation. 
A "public collection is defined in Article 3.7 as: 
a group of inventoried or otherwise identified cultural 
objects owned by: 
(a) a Contracting State 
(b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting State 
(c) a religious institution in a Contracting State; or 
(d) an institution that is established for an essentially 
cultural, educational or scientific purpose in a Contracting 
State and is recognized in that State as serving the pub-
lic interest. 
ld. at art. 3.7. 
211. Fox, supra note 154, at 237. 
212. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. 
213. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.1. Article 4.1 states: 
ld. 
The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to re-
turn it shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to 
payment of fair and reasonable compensation provided 
that the possessor neither. knew nor ought reasonably to 
have known that the object was stolen and can prove that 
it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object. 
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able compensation" as long as he or she had no knowledge that 
the object was stolen.214 Art importing nations favor requir-
ing the payment of compensation to good faith purchasers 
because it would discourage suits for the return of property if 
the original owner could not pay.21S In addition, to receive 
reasonable compensation under UNIDROIT, good faith pur-
chasers must prove that they used "due diligence" in verifying 
that the work of art had not been stolen.216 Article 4.4 would 
require possessors of stolen objects to prove that they exercised 
the due diligence that a "reasonable person would have in the 
circumstances." 2l70ne would attempt to prove such due dili-
gence by indicating the character of the parties to the acquisi-
tion, the price paid and certifying that they consulted a regis-
ter for stolen cultural objects.21s 
Usually, a good faith purchaser will be able to prove his or 
her "due diligence" by providing the object's export certifi-
cate.219 The requirement of "due diligence" was intended to 
214. Id. This provision also serves to penalize those who are not concerned with 
whether or not an object has a legitimate title. Hoffman supra note 127, at 11. 
215. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. UNIDROIT does not define "reasonable 
compensation." Id. Instead, it requires courts to make this determinations. Id. 
Factors that could be taken into account include the fair market value of the 
object, the intrinsic value of the object in its source country, the acquisition price 
paid by the good faith purchaser and costs paid for preservation and restoration. 
Id. 
216. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.l. 
217. Id. at art. 4.4. Article 4.4 specifies: 
Id. 
218. Id. 
In determining whether the possessor exercised due dili-
gence, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the 
acquisition, including the character of the parties, the 
price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reason-
ably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any 
other relevant information and documentation which it 
could reasonably have obtained, and whether the possess-
or consulted accessible agencies or took any other step 
that a reasonable person would have taken in the circum-
stances. 
219. Richard A. Rothman & James F. Fitzpatrick, Statement of Position of Con-
cerned Members of the American Cultural Community Regarding the UNIDROIT 
Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects, May 
31, 1995, at 26 [hereinafter the White Paper]. A group of prominent United States 
art dealers, museums and auction houses officially voiced their opposition to sever-
al provisions of the UNIDROIT Convention in what has become known as the 
"White Paper." See generally Id. 
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incite art dealers to provide proper documentation for objects 
they sell and deal strictly with objects with legitimate title. 220 
Problems will undoubtedly arise because many objects left 
their source countries decades or centuries before such a certif-
icate was required.221 In other cases, the original export cer-
tificate may have been lost, discarded or simply never trans-
ferred by a previous owner.222 Consequently, an expected re-
percussion is the forgery of documents provided by dealers to 
art buyers who demand export certificates and documentation 
to meet the standard of "due diligence" and thus avoid title dis-
putes.223 
C. UNIDROIT'S DEFINITION OF "STOLEN PROPERTY" 
The UNIDROIT Convention also differs from the UNESCO 
Convention regarding excavated objects, especially those which 
have been subject to looting.224 More importantly, Article 3.2 
states that "objects that have been unlawfully excavated or 
lawfully excavated and unlawfully retained" are considered 
stolen.225 UNIDROIT added this provision in response to the 
critical problem of looting at undocumented excavations.226 
Conversely, the United States museum community and 
The White Paper cites to a UNIDROIT Staff Report that states "the aim of 
[Article 8] is to exclude the possibility of the possessor's successfully invoking its 
good faith, and hence being entitled to compensation, in the absence of an export 
certificate for an object which is required by the law of the Contracting State from 
which the object has been removed." [d. at n.37. 
220. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. This would force dealers and auction 
houses to change their present practice of keeping the names of sellers confiden-
tial. [d. 
221. White Paper, supra note 219, at 28. 
222. [d. Apparently, this is a common occurrence when an object is passed 
through inheritance or donation. [d. 
223. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. 
224. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10. 
225. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.2. Article 3.2 states: "For 
the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object which has been unlawfully exca-
vated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, 
when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place." rd. 
226. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 5. The Appendix of the Convention expresses 
concern over the "pillage of archaeological sites and the resulting loss of irreplace-
able archaeological, historical and scientific infonnation . . . " UNIDROIT Conven-
tion, supra note 10, at Appendix. 
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commercial art dealers demanded that Article 3.2 be deleted 
from the UNIDROIT C onvention. 227 These groups strongly 
oppose "found in the ground" laws that transform foreign ex-
port regulations into theft.228 They contend that Article 3.2's 
definition of stolen property, by including illegally exported 
objects, "is far broader than U.S. law or any common under-
standing of the term."229 This provision would require even 
an innocent purchaser, who paid full value for an object, to 
return it to a government which had neither possession nor 
actual ownership of that object.230 Furthermore, the commer-
cial art world argues that the legal trade of antiquities will be 
burdened by preventing the export of "redundant secondary" 
objects and will create additional apprehension within the art 
market. 231 Other critics argue this provision is excessive be-
cause it illegitimizes otherwise legal forms of art trade.232 
227. White Paper, supra note 219, at 21. The White Paper states that the dele-
tion of Article 3.2 is "critical." [d. Instead, it proposes that "stolen property" be 
defined as it is in the Cultural Property Implementation Act. [d. at 21 n.24. This 
definition limits stolen property to those documented objects which were removed 
from an institution. [d. Alternatively, the definition of "stolen property" could be 
based on the traditional United States legal concept that property taken from an 
individual or entity is "stolen." [d. 
228. White Paper, supra note 219, at 22. Professor John Merryman states: "Mu-
seums have a purpose. Collectors and dealers can be engaged in legitimate activi-
ty. The fact that a piece came from a particular country does not automatically 
give that country an overpowering right to it. It might be better taken care of, 
better displayed, seen by more people, in a museum in a different country," quoted 
in Walsh, supra note 25, at 88. 
229. White Paper, supra note 219, at 20. The commercial art world argues that 
by including illegally excavated objects, Article 3.2 creates too broad a category of 
objects that would be subject to mandatory return. [d. Under this provision, the 
government of the source country could demand return of an object of which it 
"never had possession, or actual ownership . . . " [d. 
230. [d. 
231. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 5. 
232. Interview with John H. Merryman, Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford 
University Law School (Sept. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Merryman interview]. Accord-
ing to Professor Merryman, article 3.2 is excessive because it gives foreign export 
laws "blank check" application in the United States, a policy this country has 
always rejected. [d. The lawful professions of art dealing, art collecting and muse-
um management are made illegitimate by overly retentive cultural property laws 
of foreign nations. [d. 
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D. THE RECOVERY OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL 
OBJECTS 
Another highly controversial feature of the UNIDROIT 
Convention is its provision requiring that illegally exported 
cultural property be returned to its source country.233 This is 
a significantly departure from the UNESCO Convention which 
eliminated any obligation to do SO.234 In effect, Article 5 
would require the United States to enforce foreign export laws 
regardless of whether these laws are desirable or serve nation-
al or global interests.235 Furthermore, since most foreign cul-
tural property laws prohibit the export of any cultural objects 
"found in the ground," a foreign government could rely on Arti-
cle 5 for the return of illegally exported objects even if Article 3 
was deleted.236 Critics of this provision argue that by agree-
ing to abide by Article 5, the United States would be giving 
"blank. check" enforcement of any form of export law a foreign 
government may enact.237 Consequently, the United States 
museum and art dealer community urge the United States to 
reject the UNIDROIT Convention as long as Article 5 remains 
a provision.238 
The criteria an object must meet in order to justify its 
return to its source country, outlined in Article 5.3, have prov-
en highly controversial.239 According to Article 5.3 of the final 
233. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. Article 5.1 states "A Contracting State 
may request the court or other competent authority of another Contracting State 
to order the return of a cultural object illegally exported from the territory of the 
requesting State." UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5. 
234. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7. See supra note 108-110 and 
accompanying text for discussion of UNESCO art. 7(a). 
235. White Paper, supra note 219, at 23-24. 
236. ld. at 22. 
237. ld. at 30. As a result, American museums would be precluded from collect-
ing any range of works and those who visit these museums would be deprived of 
learning about these forms of art. ld. 
238. ld. at 21-22. 
239. Merryman Interview, supra note 232. The 1993 Draft UNIDROIT Conven-
tion contained these criteria in article 5.2. See 1993 Draft Convention, infra note 
241, at art. 5.2. However, the final UNIDROIT Convention lists these same crite-
ria under article 5.3. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art.5.3. The 
American museum community and art trade voiced their demand for the deletion 
of article 5.2 (1993 Draft Convention) in the White Paper. White Paper, supra 
note 219, at 24. They argued that the criteria of article 5.2 allows for such a 
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draft, a foreign government can obtain the return of illegally 
exported cultural property through an administrative body or 
court, provided it can establish that the object "significantly 
impairs: the physical integrity of the object or of its context; 
the integrity of a complex object; the preservation of informa-
tion of, for example, a scientific or historical character; the 
traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous 
community, or establishes that the object is of significant cul-
tural importance for the requesting State."240 These criteria 
are significantly looser than those contained in the preliminary 
draftS.241 Art importing nations, such as Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom proposed limit-
ing the definition of cultural property to objects of "outstanding 
cultural significance.,,242 Countries that are rich in artifacts 
and want to retain them, including Greece, Iran, Mexico, Nepal 
and Turkey, lobbied to add another category of cultural proper-
ty: objects of "significance for natural heritage."243 Although 
the final draft of the UNIDROIT Convention incorporates nei-
ther of these proposals, the definition of cultural property en-
compasses the broad definition favored by art source na-
tions.244 
The American archaeological community supports this 
provision so that a public agency of the United States could 
broad definition of "cultural property" that U.S. courts would be required to en· 
force all foreign export and cultural property laws. [d. at 23. 
240. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.3. (emphasis added) 
241. Merryman interview, supra note 232. 
Article 5.2 of the 1993 draft UNIDROIT Convention allows for the return of 
cultural property if its removal "significantly impairs" one or more of the following 
interests: 
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its con· 
text, 
(b) the integrity of a complex object, 
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a sci· 
entific or historical character, 
(d) the use of the object by a living culture, 
or establishes that the object is of outstanding cultural 
importance for the requesting State. 
Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects, Study LXX - Doc. 40, at art. 5.2, 1993 [hereinafter 1993 Draft Conven-
tion]. (emphasis added) 
242. Borodkin, supra note 124, at 380 n.15. 
243. [d. 
244. See generally, White Paper, supra note 219, at 23. 
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bring a claim in a foreign court for the return of objects re-
moved in violation of a tribal, state or local law.245 Mean-
while, the commercial art market disagrees with the criteria of 
Article 5.2 because the scope of objects eligible for return is too 
broad and will make a significant amount of the art trade 
illegitimate, only to encourage the over-retention of art in 
source nations.246 A government may obtain the return of an 
object by merely showing that the object is of "significant cul-
tural importance" for the requesting State."247 Consequently, 
the American museum and art dealing community describe the 
burden created by Article 5.3 as meaningless.,,248 
As the UNIDROIT Convention provides no guidelines 
quantifying an object's cultural importance, a country will need 
only to obtain an expert to testify that the object is indeed of 
"significant cultural importance" to meet this vague stan-
dard.249 The museum and art dealing community contends 
that, as a result, the United States will have to enforce all 
foreign export and cultural property laws.25o 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the illicit art market is thriving and will un-
doubtedly continue to be a lucrative form of business, effective 
legislation governing the legitimate flow of cultural property 
could minimize the demand for black market art trade and 
promote the protection of national treasures.251 The free flow 
245. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. The U.S. Department of the Interior, 
which has legal and regulatory responsibility for the preservation and protection of 
archaeological objects in this country also supported the extension of protection to 
"illegally exported cultural objects." [d. at 5. 
246. Merryman interview, supra note 232. 
247. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.3. 
248. White Paper, supra note 219, at 22. The wording of the draft Convention, 
which the White Paper opposed, required a government to prove an object was of 
"outstanding cultural importance" to obtain its return. 1993 Draft Convention, 
supra note 241, at art. 5.2. (emphasis added). However, the final UNIDROIT Con-
vention, passed one month after the White Paper was submitted, creates an even 
less stringent standard than the wording of the draft Convention. See generally, 
supra note 240. 
249. White Paper, supra note 219, at 23. 
250. [d. 
251. Stille, supra note 42, at 33. Professor Merryman believes "as much above-
ground movement of cultural property is a good thing all around. There should be 
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of art can be balanced with the desire to retain objects of cul-
tural significance if source countries agree to allow secondary 
pieces to go to foreign museums while keeping national trea-
sures within their borders.252 
The UNIDROIT Convention had the potential for balanc-
ing the various interests and eradicating some of the legal 
issues that have been problematic in the past for claims for the 
return of stolen cultural property.253 Unfortunately, the final 
draft of the UNIDROIT Convention contains critical provisions 
that would disadvantage art importing nations while giving art 
source nations the increased power to restrict export and re-
gain possession of cultural property.254 Furthermore, this con-
vention requires art market nations to give "blank check" cred-
it to foreign cultural property export laws.255 Since the 
UNIDROIT Convention favors the retentive policies of art 
source countries, it is doubtful that major art importing na-
tions like the United States will ratify it.256 Only a document 
that gives comparable weight to the competing interests of art 
importing and art source nations will be widely adopted and 
successfully utilized.257 
Wide-range acceptance is crucial to the Convention be-
cause it will only have an impact if a significant number of 
countries become signatories to it.258 The UNIDROIT Conven-
tion is applicable in situations where it has been adopted by 
both the State requesting the object and the State where the 
request is brought.259 Consequently, if major art importing 
a rational, sensible trade in art," quoted in [d. 
252. [d. 
253. Merryman Interview, supra note 232. UNESCO requested UNIDROIT de-
sign a new accord to replace the ineffective UNESCO Convention. Hoffman, supra 
note 99, at 5. 
254. See generally White Paper, supra note 219. 
255. Merryman interview, supra note 232. 
256. [d. The main contentions that art importing nations have with the 
UNIDROIT Convention are found in articles 3.2 and 5. [d. These articles strongly 
favor retentionist policies of art source nations and are contrary to the interests of 
the United States. [d. 
257. See generally Merryman Interview, supra note 232. 
258. See generally Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. One of the downfalls of the 
UNESCO Convention was that it was not ratified by enough countries. See supra 
note 126. 
259. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art 10.2. Article 10.2 provides: 
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countries refuse to sign this accord, UNIDROIT will be power-
less in regulating the traffic of stolen cultural property.260 
Only a cooperative effort among nations, based on a scheme 
that balances the various interests of art source and art im-
porting countries, can achieve this goal.261 Unfortunately, the 
UNIDROIT Convention fails to create this vital balance.262 
Monique Olivier" 
"The provisions of Chapter III shall apply only in respect of a cultural object that 
is illegally exported after this Convention enters into force for the requesting State 
as well as the State where the request is brought." Id. 
260. Merryman Interview, supra note 232. 
261. Id. 
262. See generally White Paper, supra note 219 . 
... Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997. 
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APPENDIX 
UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN OR 
ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL 
OBJECTS 
(ARTICLES 1 - 11) 
CHAPI'ER 1 - SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND DEFINITION 
ARTICLE 1 
This Convention applies to claims of an international character 
for: 
(a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects 
(b) the return of cultural objects removed from the territo-
ry of a Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the 
export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cul-
tural heritage (hereinafter "illegally exported cultural objects"). 
ARTICLE 2 
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are 
those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance 
for archaeology, prehistory, literature, art or science and be-
long to one of the categories listed in the Annex to this Con-
vention. 
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CHAPTER II - RESTITUTION OF STOLEN CULTURAL 
OBJECTS 
ARTICLE 3 
(1) For the possessor of a cultural object which has been 
stolen shall return it. 
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object 
which has been unlawfully excavated or laWfully excavated but 
unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when consistent 
with the law of the State where the excavation took place. 
(3) Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a 
period of three years from the time when the claimant knew 
the location of the cultural object and the identity of its pos-
sessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years of the 
theft. 
(4) However, a claim for restitution of a cultural object 
forming an integral part of an identified monument or archaeo-
logical site, or belonging to a public collection, shall not be 
subject to time limitations other than a period of three years 
from the time when the claimant knew the location of the 
culturai object and the identity of the possessor. 
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding para-
graph, any Contracting State may declare that a claim is sub-
ject to a time limitation of 75 years or such longer period as is 
provided in its law. A claim made in another Contracting State 
for restitution of a cultural object displaced from a monument, 
archaeological site or public collection in a Contracting State 
making such a declaration shall also be subject to that time 
limitation. 
(6) A declaration referred to in the preceding paragraph 
shall be made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession. 
(7) For the purposes of this Convention, a "public collec-
tion" consists of a group of inventoried or otherwise identified 
cultural objects owned by: 
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(a) a Contracting State 
(b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting State 
(c) a religious institution in a Contracting State; or 
(d) an institution that is established for an essentially cultural, 
educational or scientific purpose in a Contracting State and is 
recognized in that State as serving the public interest. 
(8) In addition, a claim for restitution of a sacred or com-
munally important cultural object belonging to and used by a 
tribal or indigenous community in a Contracting State as part 
of that community's traditional or ritual use, shall be subject 
to the time limitation applicable to public collections. 
ARTICLE 4 
(1) The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to 
return it shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to 
payment of fair and reasonable compensation provided that the 
possessor neither knew nor ought to have known that the 
object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence 
when acquiring the object. 
(2) Without prejudice to the right of the possessor to com-
pensation referred to in the preceding paragraph, reasonable 
efforts shall be made to have the person who transferred the 
cultural object to the possessor, or any prior transferor, pay the 
compensation where to do so would be consistent with the law 
of the State in which the claim is brought. 
(3) Payment of compensation to the possessor by the claim-
ant, when this is required, shall be without prejudice to the 
right of the claimant to recover it from any other person. 
(4) In determining whether the possessor exercised due 
diligence, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the 
acquisition, including the character of the parties, the price 
paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessi-
ble register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant 
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information and documentation which it reasonably could have 
obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agen-
cies or took any other step that a reasonable person would 
have taken in the circumstances. 
(5) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable posi-
tion than the person from whom it acquired the cultural object 
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously. 
CHAPI'ER III - RETURN OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTED 
CULTURAL OBJECTS 
ARTICLE 5 
(1) A Contracting State may request the court or other 
competent authority of another Contracting State to order the 
return of a cultural object illegally exported from the territory 
of the requesting State. 
(2) A cultural object which has been temporarily exported 
from the territory of the requesting State, for purposes such as 
exhibition, research or restoration, under a permit issued ac-
cording to its law regulating its export for the purpose of pro-
tecting its cultural heritage and not returned in accordance 
with the terms of that permit shall be deemed to have been 
illegally exported. 
(3) The court or other competent authority of the State 
addressed shall order the return of an illegally exported cultur-
al object if the requesting State establishes that the removal of 
the object from its territory significantly impairs one or more 
of the following interests: 
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its context; 
(b) the integrity of a complex object; 
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific 
or historical character; 
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or establishes that the object is of significant cultural impor-
tance for the requesting State. 
(4) Any request made under paragraph 1 of this article 
shall contain or be accompanied by such information of a factu-
al or legal nature as may assist the court or other competent 
authority of the State addressed in determining whether the 
requirements of paragraphs 1 to 3 have been met. 
(5) Any request for return shall be brought within a period 
of three years from the time when the requesting State knew 
the location of the cultural object and the identity of its pos-
sessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the 
date of the export or from the date on which the object should 
have been returned under a permit referred to in paragraph 2 
of this article. 
ARTICLE 6 
(1) The possessor of a cultural object who acquired the 
object after it was illegally exported shall be entitled, at the 
time of its return, to payment by the requesting State of fair 
and reasonable compensation, provided that the possessor 
neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known at the time 
of acquisition that the object had been illegally exported. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor knew or ought 
reasonably to have known that the cultural object had been 
illegally exported, regard shall be had to the circumstances of 
the acquisition, including the absence of an export certificate 
required under the law of the requesting State. 
(3) Instead of compensation, and in agreement with the 
requesting State, the possessor required to return the cultural 
object to that State, may decide: 
(a) to retain ownership of the object; or 
(b) to transfer ownership against payment or gratuitously to a 
person of its choice residing in the requesting State who pro-
vides the necessary guarantees. 
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(4) The cost of returning the cultural object in accordance 
with this article shall be borne by the requesting State, with-
out prejudice to the right of that State to recover costs from 
any other person. 
(5) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable posi-
tion that the person from whom it acquired the cultural object 
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously. 
ARTICLE 7 
(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply where: 
(a) the export of a cultural object is no longer illegal at the 
time at which the return is requested; or 
(b) the object was exported during the lifetime of the person 
who created it or within a period of fifty years following the 
death of that person. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
the preceding paragraph, the provisions of this Chapter shall 
apply where a cultural object was made by a member or mem-
bers of a tribal or indigenous community for traditional or 
ritual use by that community and the object will be returned to 
that community. 
CHAPTER IV - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 8 
(1) A claim under Chapter II and a request under Chap-
ter III may be brought before the courts or other competent 
authorities of the Contracting State where the cultural object 
is located, in addition to the courts or other competent authori-
ties otherwise having jurisdiction under the rules in force in 
Contracting States. 
(2) The parties may agree to submit the dispute to any 
court or other competent authority or to arbitration. 
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(3) Resort may be had to the provisional, including protec-
tive, measures available under the law of the Contracting 
State where the object is located even when the claim for resti-
tution or request for return of the object is brought before the 
courts or other competent authorities of another Contracting 
State. 
ARTICLE 9 
(1) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contract-
ing State from applying any rules more favourable to the resti-
tution or the return of stolen or illegally exported cultural 
objects than provided for by this Convention. 
(2) This article shall not be interpreted as creating an 
obligation to recognise or enforce a decision of a court or other 
competent authority of another Contracting State that departs 
from the provisions of this Convention. 
ARTICLE 10 
(1) The provisions of Chapter II shall apply only in re-
spect of a cultural object that is stolen after this Convention 
enters into force in respect of the State where the claim is 
brought, provided that: 
(a) the object was stolen from the territory of a Contracting 
State after the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State; or 
(b) the object is located in a Contracting State after the entry 
into force of the Convention for that State. 
(2) The provisions of Chapter III shall apply only in re-
spect of a cultural object that is illegally exported after this 
Convention enters into force for the requesting State as well as 
the State where the request is brought. 
(3) This Convention does not in any way legitimise any 
illegal transaction of whatever nature which has taken place 
before the entry into force of this Convention or which is ex-
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cluded under paragraphs (1) or (2) of this article, nor limit any 
right of a State or other person to make a claim under reme-
dies available outside the framework of this Convention for the 
restitution or return of a cultural object stolen or illegally 
exported before entry into force of this Convention. 
CHAPTER V - FINAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 11 
(1) This Convention is open for signature at the conclud-
ing meeting of the Diplomatic Conference for the adoption of 
the draft Unidroit Convention on the International Return of 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and will remain 
open for signature by all States at Rome until 30 June 1996. 
(2) This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval by States which have signed it. 
(3) This Convention is open for accession by all States 
which are not signatory States as from the date it is open for 
signature. 
(4) Ratification, acceptance, approval· or accession is sub-
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